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5.1  Introduction 
Given the economic importance of the two nations, the economic relation- 
ship between the United States and Japan is perhaps the most significant bilat- 
eral economic linkage in the world economy today. Unfortunately, the domi- 
nant feature of the relationship in recent years has been disputes about trade. 
The core of  the problem is undoubtedly the persistent trade imbalance be- 
tween the two nations. 
The magnitude of the trade imbalance remains large, The United States ran 
a merchandise trade deficit of over $1 18.5 billion in 1988, and $109 billion in 
1989. Japan had a global trade surplus of $78.3 billion in 1988 and $65 billion 
in  1989. On a bilateral level, the trade imbalance between the United States 
and Japan was $5 1.8  billion in 1988 and $49 billions in 1989. 
U.S.-Japanese bilateral trade disputes have several important facets. The 
first element is the set of  overall macroeconomic factors. Many economists 
have pointed out that the large U.S. government budget deficit, the low U.S. 
savings rate, and the high value of the dollar in the early 1980s provide the 
fundamental environment that  sustains the trade deficit. In  1985, the high 
U.S.  exchange rate began to reverse itself. But the rise of  the Japanese yen 
failed to affect the U. S. trade balance significantly.  I 
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A second important dimension of the U.S.-Japan trade problem centers on 
alleged policies carried out by the Japanese government to promote Japan’s 
industries. Johnson (1982) and Scott and Lodge (1985) highlight  how Japa- 
nese trade and industrial policies have contributed to the success of Japan’s 
exports in  the  world  market.  However,  Krugman  (1984)  and  Saxonhouse 
(1983a,  1983b) dispute the effectiveness of such industrial targeting. The al- 
leged  government policies  include subsidies,  tax  incentives  for investment, 
subsidized loans,  government-sponsored  cooperative research  and  develop- 
ment projects, and protection of infant industries. 
The third important aspect of the U.S.-Japan trade problem is the structure 
of industry in Japan and how its unique organization can affect the trade bal- 
ance, the so-called structural impediments to trade. The areas of scrutiny in- 
volve  banking-industry  relationships,  the  manufacturer-supplier  relation- 
ships, the alliances between  various business concerns,  and the behavior of 
the distributors. It is often alleged that the cooperative Japanese keiretsu (in- 
dustrial groups) and the complex and inefficient Japanese distribution network 
constitute invisible barriers to trade. For example, it has been pointed out that 
firms belonging to the same group often purchase from one another rather than 
from foreign sources.2 Foreign producers also complain that they cannot find 
appropriate distributors to carry their products in Japan. 
As long as the U.S.-Japan trade imbalances continue to be significant, these 
elements will be widely  discussed.  Recent events have focused attention on 
the last facet-the  structure of Japanese industries.  In May  1989, the U.S. 
government, invoking a provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act (the Super 
301) singled out Japan and two other countries for maintaining a pattern of 
unfair trade barriers that are harmful to U.S. exports. Negotiations are being 
conducted  to  improve  U.S.  trade  balance  with  Japan.  In  April  1990, the 
United States and Japan reached accords to expand sales of  American wood 
products,  satellites,  and  supercomputers  to Japanese  markets.  Since these 
agreements, no new formal trade complaints have been launched against Ja- 
pan. Nevertheless, broad-scale talks are continuing that are aimed at modify- 
ing the economic structures of Japan, talks meant to remove Japan’s “major 
structural barriers to imports.” One such major area of discussion is the phe- 
nomenon and conduct of Japanese industrial groupings. 
In this paper I present-an analysis of the relationship between the Japanese 
keiretsu and U.S.-Japanese  industry trade balances. Although there is a con- 
sensus that the aggregate trade deficit  is best explained by  macroeconomic 
factors, it is often alleged that the Japanese keiretsu interfere with trade at an 
industry level because of their extensive intragroup dealings. In the next sec- 
tion, I present some summary statistics and institutional background concern- 
ing Japan’s corporate groups. In section 5.4 I construct an oligopolistic model 
of how Japan’s keiretsu can affect both U.S. and Japanese exports. Based on 
2.  For an interesting case study, see Kreinin (1988). 139  Japanese Industrial Groups 
this model, I conduct some simple empirical tests of whether Japan’s keiretsu 
is a factor in U.S.-Japan trade. Some concluding remarks are given in the last 
section. 
5.2  The Japanese Keiretsu 
5.2.1  Classification of Industrial Groups 
A Japanese  industrial group consists of a group of firms that are related 
economically. Group members are interconnected in a variety of ways, includ- 
ing cross-holding of shares; intragroup financing by nucleus banks; existence 
of general trading firms (sogo shosha) as trading arms and as organizers of 
various projects; formation of clubs (shacho-hi)  where presidents of member 
companies meet and exchange information; mutual appointment of directors, 
officers and other key personnel; and joint investment  by group members in 
new industries.3 
There are three types of industrial  group^.^ One is the descendant of the 
prewar zaibatsu (giant business combines), a second is the bank group (con- 
sisting of firms that center on major banks), while the third group is composed 
of one or more large independent industrial manufacturers, their subsidiaries, 
affiliates, and suppliers.  Unlike the first two groups, which deal with a wide 
range of products, this last group tends to concentrate in particular industries. 
In this paper we will focus on the leading sixteen industrial  group^.^ Three 
of these groups-Mitsubishi,  Matsui, and Sumitomo-are  of zaibatsu origin. 
The prewar zaibatsu were groups of companies partly owned and controlled 
by a family holding company. Each family zaibatsu included a bank, a trust 
company, an insurance company, and a trading company to buy and sell goods 
on behalf of the member firms. Until World War 11, the Japanese economy was 
heavily influenced by ten major zaibatsu, which accounted for approximately 
35 percent of.the aggregate paid-up capital of all Japanese companies in 1946. 
After the war, all the major zaibatsu were dissolved. However, gradually some 
splinter companies reestablished their former associations, exchanging shares 
with other firms bearing the common zaibatsu name and doing business with 
one another through the trading companies. They exchanged directors and set 
up clubs where company presidents could meet.  In this way there was a re- 
vival between  1952 and  1965 of  the  industrial groups with prewar  connec- 
tions.  Mitsubishi Sh6ji (currently Mitsubishi Corporation),  which was split 
into  140 companies, was reestablished  in  1954. Through a merger of three 
split companies  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was revived in  1964. It should 
3. Not all groups engage in all these joint activities. 
4. In  some classifications,  the last type (prime manufacturer-supplier) is subsumed under the 
5.  Again, under other classification schemes, the focus is on six groups rather than sixteen. The 
previous two. 
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be noted, however, that the postwar zaibatsu groups are much more loosely 
connected than their prewar counterparts, which involved a vertical hierarchy 
in which the family holding company held majority or near majority shares of 
all group companies and exercised vertical  control.  However, holding com- 
panies were outlawed in postwar Japan under the antimonopoly law and the 
shares of companies of a zaibatsu group were distributed among the member 
companies. 
The second type of industrial group centers on a principal bank. Examples 
of this type include Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa, Takai, and IBJ. For most of Japan’s 
modem history (until perhaps the late 1970s), capital and foreign exchange 
have been in relatively short supply. The formation of these financial keiretsu 
during the 1950s and 1960s probably came in response to the banks’ ability to 
finance  firm operation  and  investment.  The various members,  though  typi- 
cally  all indebted to the group bank, need  not be particularly closely  asso- 
ciated with one another. Transactions among group companies are never ex- 
clusive,  and affiliated firms often engage in transactions with outsiders. As 
table 5.1 shows, in 1985 bank financing of affiliated companies ranged from 
12.1 percent  to 27.7 percent  of  all financing. The remaining finance came 
from sources that were not members of the same group. The bank groups are 
expected to be less and less cohesive over time, since other sources of financ- 
ing, including the domestic stock market,  issuance of bonds, and borrowing 
from foreign banks, are becoming relatively more important.6 
The last type of  industrial group is formed around a prime manufacturing 
company (motouke).  This type includes, among others, the Toyota and Nissan 
groups in the auto industry, the Nippon Steel group in the iron and steel indus- 
try, the Hitachi, Matsushita, and Toshiba-IHI groups in the electrical and elec- 
tronic industry. It is made up of a cluster of  subsidiaries, affiliates, supplies, 
and subcontractors, with the major manufacturer at the apex. 
There will be dozens and even hundreds of smaller suppliers and sales com- 
panies around the major company and its important affiliates. One or more of 
the group companies or affiliates will  hold  shares of the smaller members. 
Member companies will be engaged in a range of interrelated activities. This 
type of group resembles a vertical hierarchy with large and stable leaders at 
the top and firms of  decreasing  size and  skill  level beneath  them.  Besides 
shareholding, the linkages are maintained by extension of credit and subcon- 
tracting.  These manufacturing  groups  are formed by a combination of  two 
processes. One is the consolidation into groups of small firms that for various 
reasons come to depend on large group members  for customers,  while  the 
second process is the spinning off  of  specialized divisions from main manu- 
facturers. 
As an example of  the manufacturer-supplier  relationship,  according to a 
6. Note, however, that many main banks are involved as underwriters in the issuance of bonds 
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Table 5.1  Intragroup Financing 
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Source: Oriental Economist (Kigyu Keiretsu Soran) 1987. 
survey conducted in 1977 (Japanese Agency for Small and Medium-sized En- 
terprises  1977), an  unnamed Japanese auto manufacturer (believed to  be 
Toyota) had direct relations with 122 first-tier suppliers and indirect relation- 
ships with 5,437 second-tier suppliers and 41,703 third-tier subcontractors. 
Between 1973 and 1984 only 3 firms exited from the association of  first-tier 
Toyota suppliers while 21 firms entered. This example shows that typically 
the main manufacturer is at the top of a pyramid of a large number of stratified 
smaller firms. 
Unlike the bank keiretsu, the manufacturer-subcontractor grouping seems 
to be  increasing in importance. Large firms rely more and more on subcon- 
tracting to perform a variety of activities. According to the survey just men- 
tioned, the proportion of  subcontractors in the manufacturing sector has in- 
creased from 53.1 percent in  1966 to 65.5 percent in  1981. For the electric 
and electronics industry, the figure is even higher. In 1981, 85.3  percent of the 
small and medium-sized firms in  that industry were subcontractors to larger 
firms. 
5.2.2  The Importance of  Industrial Groups 
In this section, we provide some summary statistics concerning the impor- 
tance of  the industrial groups in Japan. Among the sixteen groups that this 
paper highlights, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa are 
the most important and are sometimes categorized separately in the following 
tables. The number of  companies, number of employees, annual sales, and 
net profit as a percentage of  all nonfinancial Japanese companies for each 
group in  1980 are given in table 5.2. In  1980, the sixteen industrial groups 
accounted for 920 companies, 2.8 million employees, 194,401 billion yen in 
sales and their net profits were 2,176 billion yen. 
As a percentage of all nonfinancial Japanese companies, about 0.06 percent 
of Japanese firms and 9.9 percent of Japanese employees are members of in- 
dustrial groups. In terms of sales and net profits, the sixteen groups accounted 
for 23.7 percent and 23.6 percent, respectively, of  the totals for nonfinancial 
companies. 
How do these Japanese groups compare with corporations abroad? In terms 142  K. C.Fung 
Table 5.2  Importance of Industrial Groups 
Industrial 
Sales as 
Share  Employment  Profits as 
of  Total  as Share of  Share of 
Sales  Total  Total Profits 
No. of  Nonfinancial  of Nonfinancial  Nonfinancial 
of  Employment  of 
Group  Companies  Companies  Companies  Companies 
Six major groups: 
Mitsubishi  139 
Mitsui  I08 
Sumitomo  117 
Fuyo  110 
DKB  64 
Sanwa  84 
Tokai  25 
IBJ  23 
Nippon Steel  40 
Hitachi  38 
Nissan  27 
Toyota  38 
Matsushita  25 
Toshiba-IHI  40 
Tokyu  19 
Seibu  22 
Total  919 




















































Note: The percentages in parentheses are for the year 1985. However, they do not come from the 
same source as the data for 1980. 
Source: Dodwell Marketing Consultants Industrial Groupings in Japan, rev. 1982-83,  Oriental 
Economist (Kigyo Keiretsu Soran), 1987; Japan Economic Journal  (Nihon Keizai Shimbun),  1 
January 1980. 
of  annual sales, each of  the six leading industrial groups is larger than most 
major multinationals.  The Mitsubishi Group, the largest industrial  group in 
Japan,  is about twice  as large as Royal  DutcWShell.  The DKB group, the 
Mitsui group and the Fuyo group are each almost equivalent to Exxon, the 
largest company in the world in 1980. In table 5.3, we compare the sales of 
six major Japanese groups with those of other leading multinationals. 
5.2.3  Linkages Between Group Members 
One important linkage among affiliated companies is through share cross- 
holding. In table 5.4 I present some statistics of  the extent of intragroup cross 
shareholding by the major groups.  The cross-holding ratio is defined as the 
total value of members’ shares held by all group members as a percentage of 
the total value of  all paid-up capital of  the entire group companies listed on 
the stock exchange. 
Another  important  linkage  among  group members  is  their  relationships 143  Japanese Industrial Groups 
Table 5.3  Comparison of Six Major Japanese Groups with Multinationals 
1980 sales  Index 





























































Source: Dodwell Marketing Consultants, Industrial Groupings in Japan, rev. ed. (1982-83). 
Table 5.4  Crossholding of Shares in Six Major Groups 
1971  1974  1980  1985 
Mitsubishi  27.6  30.6  20.7  25.2 
Mitsui  14.3  17.4  17.7  17.9 
Sumitomo  24.7  27.9  21.4  25.0 
Fuyo  20.5  17.4  16.4  15.8 
DKB  18.6  21.2  14.1  13.3 
Sanwa  14.1  16.0  13.6  16.8 
Sources: Japanese  Fair Trade Commission, Second Report  on  the  Operations  of  the  General 
Trading  Companies,  1975;  Dodwell  Marketing  Consultants,  Industrial  Groupings  in  Japan 
(1982-83).  rev. ed. (1990), Oriental Economist (Kigyo Keiretsu Sorun). 1987. 
with general trading companies. General trading companies (Sogo shosha) are 
important trading arms of seven major industrial groups: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa, and Tokai. The activities of these companies 
are quite diverse. They trade in more than twenty thousand different commod- 
ities on a commission  basis, invest  in domestic and overseas markets,  and 
extend credit to affiliated companies and customers. They also coordinate the 
setting up of joint ventures overseas. Their functions include marketing/distri- 
bution,  financing,  project  organizing, and  information  gathering.  The nine 
leading general trading companies and their affiliations are listed in table 5.5. 
The existence of group-affiliated general trading companies is important in 
our context because of their significant involvement in international trade. In 
1980, the value of  exports handled by the nine Sogo shosha amounted to $66 144  K. C.Fung 
Table 5.5  Affiliations of Leading General Trading Companies 
General Trading Companies  Industrial Group 
Mitsubishi Corp. 
Mitsui & Co. 
Sumitomo Corp. 
Maruberi Corp. 














Sources: Dodwell Marketing Consultants,  Industrial  Groupings  in  Japan, rev. ed  (1982-83). 
M. Y.  Yoshino and T. Lifson, The Invisible Link: Japan's Sogo Shosha and the Organization of 
Trade (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,  1988). 
'These  are primary  affiliations. C. Itoh & Co. is also related to Sumitomo and Toyo Menka is 
related also to Mitsui. 
billion and the value of imports was $80 billion. These amounts accounted for 
roughly half of Japan's export and import activities (table 5.6). 
The major exports of the general trading companies are machinery and iron 
and steel. Their main imports are fuels, foodstuffs, and ferrous and nonferrous 
metals. The general trading companies are also active in extending financial 
assistance in the form of  business credits, loans, and payment guarantees to 
their affiliated group members. 
These statistics indicate that the Japanese keiretsu constitute a fairly signif- 
icant portion of the Japanese economy. The extent of interconnectedness var- 
ies from group to group, as do the forms of linkages. Group affiliations, how- 
ever,  almost  never  translate  into  exclusive dealings.  For  example,  group 
companies borrow from nonmember banks and affiliated suppliers supply to 
nonmember consuming corporations. With the liberalization of the Japanese 
economy, it  is expected that Japanese groups will diminish in importance. 
Nonetheless, existing  group  behavior  may  still have  an  impact  on  U.S.- 
Japanese trade. 
5.2.4  Comparison of Japanese Groups with U.S. Institutions 
When we compare the features of Japanese groups with U.S. industry char- 
acteristics and institutions, the picture becomes more complex and there are 
both differences and similarities.' 
The  existence  of  long-term  manufacturer-supplier relationships  is  not 
unique to Japan. For example, Cole and Yakushiji (1984) estimated that in 
1983 General Motors purchased 40 percent of its parts, components, and ma- 
terials from its suppliers; for Ford and Chrysler, the respective figures were 50 
7. Intercorporate ties are also found in West Germany, with banks and some holding companies 
playing a key role. See Scherer and Ross (1990, chap. 3). 145  Japanese Industrial Groups 
Table 5.6  lkade of Nine General lkading Companies 
Exports  Imports 
Nine General  Share  Nine General  Share 
Trading Companies  of Total  Trading Companies  of Total 
(Billion Yen)  Exports  (Billion Yen)  Imports 
1977  10,860  49.8%  9,204  49.7% 
1979  11,798  48.2  15,055  54.5 
1978  9,604  48.1  8,730  51.2 
1980  14,640  48.2  17,624  56.0 
Nore: Exports are in FOB value, while imports are in CIF. 
Source: Dodwell Marketing Consultants, Industrial Groupings in Japan, rev. ed. (1982-83). 
and 60 percent. However, auto firms in Japan do seem to procure a relatively 
greater portion of the parts from their subcontractors, relying less on in-house 
production. On average, it is estimated that 55  percent of  a U.S.  car’s pur- 
chased value is provided by external suppliers. For a Japanese car, estimate 
that 75 percent of  its value is supplied by  outside subcontractors. (Cole and 
Yakushiji 1984) 
In terms of bank groups there are some legal differences. U.S. banks are 
not permitted to hold stock of other nonfinancial companies on their own ac- 
count.8 In contrast, the antimonopoly law in Japan allows banks to hold up to 
5 percent of  a particular nonfinancial corp~ration.~  As a stockholder of  the 
company, the main bank often sends its representative to the company’s board 
of directors. The main bank is periodically briefed about the company’s gen- 
eral business and also often functions as financial rescuer of last resort. If  a 
member company is on the verge of bankruptcy, it is often the main bank that 
organizes the rescue package to try to save the company. For instance, when 
T6y6 K6gy6, the maker of  Mazda automobiles, was on the brink of  bank- 
ruptcy in  1979-80,  its main bank, Sumitomo Bank,  coordinated the rescue 
activities. The entire Sumitomo group switched its auto purchases to Mazda. 
It is estimated that the group members purchased eighteen thousand vehicles 
over six years (Pascale and Rohlen  1983). Overall, it seems that main banks 
in Japan play a more significant role in the activities of corporations than do 
U. S . banks. 
5.3  An Oligopolistic Model of Japanese Keiretsu 
The U.S. Trade Representative (1985) (USTR) cites three aspects of  the 
oligopolistic behavior that affects U.S .-Japanese trade. First, the government 
8. Trust departments of banks do manage pension and trust funds and invest in the stock market. 
At least legally, the funds are managed on behalf of  owners of pension and trust funds, not of the 
banks. 
9. The limit until 1987 was 10 percent of the total stock of any single company. 146  K. C.Fung 
allows “recession cartels” designed to protect declining industries. As an ex- 
ample, the USTR cites the paper industry, where cartels have existed to cope 
with the problem of high energy and raw material costs. Second, it is alleged 
that the Japanese distribution system is a close-knit network of financial and 
input-output arrangements  linking  distributors,  customers,  and  suppliers in 
such a way that nonmembers are excluded. Third, the USTR argues that the 
keiretsu conglomerates  of manufacturers,  banks and general trading compa- 
nies, by supporting each others’ activities, effectively preclude opportunities 
for non-keiretsu firms.’O 
One prominent industry where U.S. producers charge that oligopoly in Ja- 
pan restricts imports is semiconductors. In June 1985 the U.S. Semiconductor 
Industry Association petitioned the president to act under section 301 of  the 
Trade  Act  of  1974,  arguing  that  the  Japanese  protected  semiconductors 
through reciprocal buying arrangements among the six large electronics firms. 
It was alleged that Japanese firms buy their semiconductors needs primarily 
from each other. The Semiconductor Industry Association requested that the 
Japanese government force its firms to purchase more U.S. chips to offset the 
discrimination. 
Conceptually,  there are two views in the literature of the Japanese groups 
with very different welfare implications.  The first approach focuses on their 
potential exploitation of joint market power, which tends to be welfare reduc- 
ing.  The second  views  Japanese  groups  as a  mechanism  for risk  sharing, 
which tends to be Pareto improving.  In this paper, we will concentrate on a 
positive analysis of how the behavior of groups affects U.S. net exports.” 
I construct a model of international oligopoly to highlight how members of 
the Japanese groups may affect industry trade balance. The model is meant to 
set up some hypothesis for my later empirical work. Following the approach 
of Brander and Krugman (1983), I assume that the international  firms com- 
pete both at home and abroad.’* I start with the competition between a Japa- 
nese  firm J, and  an American  firm A  in the Japanese product  market.  The 
analysis for the competition in the U.S. market will be exactly symmetrical. 
The respective Japanese and U.S.  profit functions  and nA  are 
10. This line of argument is really pointing to barriers to entry, whether the potential entrants 
are foreign or domestic. 
11. Note, however, that it is possible for the groups (either due to joint monopoly or risk shar- 
ing) to improve the welfare of group members, while reducing the welfare of the Japanese con- 
sumers and/or nonmembers, including foreign producers. 
12. Brander and Krugman’s (1983) original framework focuses on homogeneous products. 
However, the  approach will  remain  valid  if  the products  are differentiated; see Fung (1991). 
Furthermore, since the outputs by the international firms are substitutes, the Cournot-Nash setting 
adopted here is arguably more appropriate because if  the firms can choose price setting versus 
quantity setting, they will endogenously choose the Cournot-Nash strategies; see Singh and Vives 
(1984). 147  Japanese Industrial Groups 
PJ1  and PA  are the product prices; x is the output produced by  the Japanese 
firm, while y is the output produced by the U.S. firm in the Japanese market. 
The two products are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. CJ1 and CA  are the 
respective cost functions, with w‘l  and WA the labor costs in each country, Pm 
the price of  some material input produced by  another member of the same 
Japanese group (5,) to which J,  belongs, and tA  is the transparent trade barriers 
that the U.S. firms face in Japan. 
The model is characterized as a two-stage game with the timing described 
as follows: J, moves first, naming P,, taking the impact of P, on the derived 
demand for m into account. Taking P, as given, J,  then sets x, while firm A 
simultaneously sets y.  The equilibrium is subgame perfect. I3 Profit maximiza- 
tion of the international Cournot-Nash firms yields 
(3)  nil  = PJI  + XPJl - c  i-0,  I - 
n;  = PA  + yp; - c; = 0, 
Given P,,  WA, wJl,  and tA,  the equilibrium market shares and product prices 
are implicitly determined by (3) and (4) and the inverse demands. The value 
of U.S. exports to Japan in this industry is given by the equilibrium value of 
PAY. 
Let us now introduce the member of the same Japanese keiretsu, J,, that 
produces the input m.  Being a member of the same group, J, will take the 
interest of the J,  into account when setting the price P,. This may be because 
it holds shares of J,,  has joint investment in projects, or has directors on its 
board from J,. To reflect this economic interaction, the profit function of J, 
can be written 
(6)  nJz = (P,m - km) + gTJl -  FJ2, 
where m is the quantity of the material input produced, k is the marginal cost 
of producing m, and g is the degree of J,’s  group affiliation to J,.  More con- 
cretely, g can be interpreted as J,’s extent of shareholding over J,.  l4  Maximi- 
zation of (6) implies 
13. The model assumes that  there are barriers to entry to  these oligopolistic industries; thus 
entry by other firms is not considered. 
14. We  can easily accommodate the phenomenon of intragroup cross shareholding if g is inter- 
preted as the extent of shareholding of  J, over J,. Let g* be the extent of sharing of  J,  over J,. 
Then 
n-‘~ = (1 -  g)(P’lx - PI(.))  + g*(P,m -  km -  F’2) 
and 
d2  = (1 - g*)(P,m -  km -  P2) + g(P:l -  C’I(.)). 
Under the  same two-stage game framework, J2 moves first to set Pm  in the first stage. In  the 
second stage, J,  sets x, given P,.  The analysis proceeds similarly as in the text and yields similar 
results. 148  K. C.Fung 
6TJZ -  6m  6m  6TJI 
6P  6P  'Prn 
k-  + g-  = 0, 
6P  --=TP~  = m  + P,-  -  (7) 
(8)  T$mpm  < 0. 
Given an exogenous g, the optimal price P, that J2 will charge is implicitly 
defined in (7). From (l)-(8), the equilibrium output and equilibrium price of 
the U.S. export can be written 
(9)  Y  = Y(WJ1,@ ,P  P,( g))  3 
(10)  PA  = P"(x,y), 
where x  = x(wJ~,w4,tA,Pm(  g)). 
To  obtain some hypothesis concerning the signs of U.S. export level and 
export value with respect to their arguments, totally differentiate (3) and (4) to 
obtain 
where  IT^:^,  =  -6116~ < 0 and A  = TI,,$,  - T$T$ > 0 is the standard 
stability condition for Cournot firms. Equations (1  1) and (12) tell us that a rise 
of  the wage rate in Japan will raise U.S. export volume but lower Japanese 
domestic output. The impact on the value of U.S.  exports is 
Thus a rise of Japanese wage rate will raise the value of U.S. exports. 
Similar calculations show that the U.S. export value is negatively related to 
the wage in the U.S. and the tariff in Japan, that is, 6(yPA)16wA  < 0, 6(yPA)/ 
6rA < 0. To obtain the effect of  the strength of  the group affiliation, totally 
differentiate (7), 
~3~~  dP, + r#mgdg  = 0, 
where  dn'lldP,  = (xP:l)(dy/dP,) -  m < 0 and P$l < 0.  Substituting into 
(14), we obtain 6Pm/6g  < 0. The impact of g on the value of Japan's import 
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where the sign of (d(  yPA)ldP,)  can be obtained in a similar fashion as in (1  3). 
A higher degree of Japanese group affiliation will lead to a smaller amount of 
U.S. exports. The reduced form of our model for U.S. export can be written 
(16) 
with 
yP"  = yP"(  WJI  ,wA ,f",P$(  g)) 
Thus the value of  U.S.  exports to Japan will rise with a higher Japanese 
wage, a lower U.S. wage rate, lower overt trade barriers in Japan, and lower 
degree of group affiliation. 
For the U.S. market, J,  exports x, and A produces y,  dome~tically.'~  Japa- 
nese exports are subjected to overt trade barriers  fJl.  Group member J2 sup- 
plies quantity of  materials m,  to J,.  Using similar reasoning as before, the 
analysis of  the impact of  wJl,lyA,fJI,  and g on U.S. imports from Japan xlP+ 
can be expressed as 6(xIP~1)/6w'l  <  0, S(x,P+)ISwA >  0, S(x,P{l)lStJl <  0, and 
S(x,P+)ISg > 0. The last comparative static term shows that group affiliation 
in our model not only restricts U.S. imports but also promotes exports. The 
reduced form of U.S. net exports TB = (yPA -  x,P$)  can be written as 
(17)  TB = TB(wJl,wA,tA,tJl,g), 
where 6TB/6wJl >  0, 6TBI6wA <  0, 6TB/6tA  < 0, 6TB/6tJl > 0, 6TBI6g < 0. 
U.S. net exports depend on the wage rate in the United States and Japan, the 
overt trade barriers in both countries, and the intensity of Japanese group affil- 
iation. U.S. industry trade balance is higher with a higher Japanese wage rate, 
a lower U.S.  wage rate, lower extent of Japanese overt trade barriers, higher 
extent of U.S. overt trade barriers, and a lower degree of Japanese group affil- 
iation. 
5.4  Econometric Analysis 
The basic econometric equation to be estimated is based on equation (17), 
which identifies the equilibrium level of U.S. net export value as a function of 
the wage costs in Japan and the United States, the overt trade barriers (tariffs 
and tariff-equivalent nontariff trade barriers) in Japan and the United States, 
and the intensity of group affiliation. The model is meant to explain the inter- 
industry variation of the value of U.S. industry trade balance with Japan. A 
linear specification of (17) gives 
15. Following Brander and Krugman (1983), I have assumed that the profit functions in the 
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(18)  TB, = OL  + p,USW, + PJW, + 
where USW,  and JW, are the U.S. and Japanese unit labor costs for industry i, 
USTQ, and JTQ, are the level of overt protection through tariffs and nontariff 
trade barriers in the United States and Japan for industry i, and g,  is the group 
affiliation intensity  for industry  i; p,  is the disturbance term. Because some 
values  of  TB, are negative, a log-linear  specification in this  instance is not 
appropriate.  From previous discussions of  this model, it is predicted that  (3, 
< 0, p,  > 0,  p,  > 0,  p,  <  0, and p,  < 0. For the purposes of this paper, the 
main coefficient of interest is p,. 
Like Petri (1990) and Yamawaki and Audretch (1988), my approach de- 
parts from the traditional emphasis of factor-intensity approach and focuses 
on oligopolistic interactions as a determinant of U. S .-Japanese trade. Further- 
more, unlike earlier literature on the studies of  determinants of  trade but in 
accord with Yamawaki and Audretch (1988) and Petri (1990), I have not con- 
fined the explanatory variables to only characteristics of  the U.S. industries. 
Instead, I have explicitly included features of Japanese industries in our equa- 
tion. 
The sources and the method of construction of the variables are given in the 
appendix. The variable that is most constraining on our choice of industries is 
the group intensity variable g,. Due to the availability of g,,  we confine our- 
selves to the year 1980 for twenty-two industries (compared with twenty-four 
industries in Yamawaki and Audretch and forty-nine in Petri). l6 
The dependent variable TB, is the trade balance between the United States 
and Japan for industry i in 1980. JTQ, and USTQ, are the sum of tariffs and 
tariff-equivalent  nontariff barriers  for Japan  and  the  United  States, respec- 
tively, for industry i in 1980. JULC, and USULC,  represent unit labor costs in 
Japan and the United States. As a proxy, I follow the literature (e.g., Yama- 
waki and Audretch 1988) and use the nominal wage divided by value added 
per worker in each industry.  It thus approximates  labor costs adjusted by a 
measure of labor productivity. 
Finally, the group intensity variable is given by two proxies. The first is the 
sales of group-affiliated companies as a percentage of total industry sale (gS,) 
and the second is the share of employment accounted for by group-affiliated 
corporations in industry i (  gE,).L* 
Table 5.7 presents  the estimation result of  the regression equations based 
on (17). Equation (A) uses the group affiliation variable gS  (percentage of total 
industry sales); equation (A,) employs the group affiliation variable gE (per- 
centage of  total  employment). All equations are estimated  by the ordinary 
least squares method. 
Table 5.7 indicates that the extent of group affiliations, either measured by 
P,UsTQ, + PJTQ, + P,g,  + L 
16. The industries, two-digit and three-digit SIC industries, are listed in the Appendix 151  Japanese Industrial Groups 
Table 5.7  Regressions with U.S. ’lkade Balance 
Constant 
Group affiliation 


















(0.31848~  lo-’) 









-  12.  I17*** 
(-4.0177) 




-  19.071* 
(- 1.9391) 
1.1635 




Nore: t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at  10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant at  1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
sales or by employment, has the expected negative sign and is significant at 
the 1 percent level. The only other variable (other than the constant) that is 
significant (at the 10 percent level) is the Japanese unit labor cost. But con- 
trary to our theory, Japan’s unit labor costs are negatively related to U.S. net 
exports to Japan. There can be several potential explanations for this unex- 
pected  sign.  In  studying characteristics of  group-affiliated firms,  Nakatani 
(  1984) found Japanese group-affiliated firms pay higher wages than indepen- 
dent firms. Thus both group affiliation and high wages in Japan may worsen 
U.S. net exports to Japan. Alternately, both Yamawaki and Audretch (1988) 
and Petri (1990) found that Japan’s technology intensity and expenditure on 
research and development are positively related to Japan’s exports. It may be 
that Japan’s high wages partly  serve as proxies  for these variables,  and in 
industries  where Japan’s wages  are high  (due to more scientists and engi- 
neers), the U.S. trade balance is worse. Other variables such as the overt trade 
barriers  and the U.S. unit labor cost have signs contrary to our model, but 
they are all insignificant.  Using the coefficients of  the group affiliation vari- 
ables in equations (A) and (Al), we can further estimate the percentage de- 
cline in U.S. industry net exports due to the Japanese keiretsu. The results are 
presented in the Appendix, which shows that the industries most affected by 
Japanese groups are leather and leather products, nonferrous metal and prod- 
ucts,  shipbuilding, and rubber products. The industries that are typically of 
the most concern to the U.S. are affected only a relatively small amount. For 
example, for food and kindred products, the drop in trade balance due to Jap- 152  K. C. Fung 
anese groups is only 0.301 percent. For such other industries as chemical and 
allied products, general machinery, and scientific and optical instruments, the 
impacts are 3.10 percent, 1.19 percent, and 1.17 percent, respectively. 
5.5  Further Empirical Analysis 
In the last section, I obtained some evidence that Japanese group strength is 
negatively correlated with U.S. net exports. To  test the sensitivity of the re- 
sults, I conduct several sets of  variations of the basic empirical tests. First, I 
use instrumental variable estimation to correct for biases that may arise if the 
Japanese group-strength variables are endogenous. I will also estimate the ba- 
sic equations with the addition of potentially relevant variables, such as trans- 
port costs, advertising intensity (as a proxy for product differentiation), and 
the number of firms in each industry. Lastly I run modified regressions with 
U.S. gross exports to Japan and the world’s trade balance with Japan as the 
dependent variables. 
5.5.1  Instrumental Variable Estimation 
In  the basic estimation equation I provide estimates of  the effects of  the 
Japanese group strengths on U.S. net exports, assuming that g is an indepen- 
dent variable. However, arguments can be made to treat g as endogenous.” In 
this  subsection I provide an instrumental variable estimation to correct for 
potential biases due to the endogenity of group strengths. 
The instruments that I have selected are average firm profits in each Japa- 
nese industry (JFPJ,  proportion of  temporary employees in each Japanese 
industry (JTE,),  proportion of  individual proprietorship in each Japanese in- 
dustry (JZP,), and percentage of  firms with more than three hundred employ- 
ees in each Japanese industry (JLF,). If  Japanese groups coordinate in their 
activities, group strengths should be correlated with average profits.20  Group- 
affiliated firms with long-term suppliers may use fewer temporary employees. 
Small subcontractors are also more likely to be individually owned. Finally, 
suppliers of  parts are likely to have smaller numbers of  employees.Z’  Thus 
these  instruments should be  highly  correlated with  the  intensity of  group 
strengths. 
17. Since unit labor costs capture differences in productivities, the use of these variables in both 
countries will partly reflect comparative advantage due to technological differences. 
18. Measures of  gS, and gE,  for various industries are constructed from Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants (1982-83),  and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1981). 
19. For example, if Japanese groups are formed for risk sharing, group strength will be deter- 
mined by how risky a particular industry is. 
20. Caves and Uekusa (1976), Nakatani (1984), and Roehl (1983) found that contrary to the 
view that keiretsu collude, group-affiliated nonfinancial companies did not realize as high an av- 
erage rate of  profits as comparable independent firms for the period 1961-75. 
21. Legally, a subcontractor is defined as a firm with three hundred or fewer employees, or with 
one hundred million yen or less paid-in capital and has a contractual relation with a larger firm for 
supplying a part, processed product, or material. 153  Japanese Industrial Groups 
Table 5.8  Regressions with Predicted Values of Group Strengths 
Eq. (A)  Eq. (A,) 
Constant  12.5708***  11.10643*** 
Group affiliation  -  16.556***  -  13.9195*** 
(3.7885)  (3.4686) 
(-4.5630)  (-4.3818) 
U.S.  tariffs and  -  14.9038  -  13.3667 
quotas  (- 0.7863)  (-0.6895) 
Japanese tariffs  2.4406  1.4447 
and quotas  (0.3228)  (0.18632) 
labor cost  (- 1.8949)  (I  .725O4) 
cost  ( -  0.3908)  ( -  0.5037) 
Japanese unit  -  16.4802  -  15.1560 




0.605187  -0.58701  1 
0.481808  0.457951 
4.90511  4.54838 
Norest  Eq. (A) uses the predicted values of  gS and eq. (A,) the predicted values of  gE as the 
group affiliation variables. The values in parentheses are ?-statistics. 
***Significant at  1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
Table 5.8 shows the regression of U.S. net exports with the group variables 
adjusted by  instrumental variables.Z2  The group strength variables, both mea- 
sured by  sales and employment, are still significant at  l percent level. The 
adjusted R2  improves from around 0.4 in table 5.7 to 0.48 and 0.45 in table 
5.8. Overall, the instrumental variable estimations yield  similar results as 
those with the simple OLS estimations. The degree of Japanese group affilia- 
tions remains statistically significant. 
5.5.2  Transport Costs as an Explanatory Variable 
One interesting variation on the basic regression equation is the addition of 
transport costs. Lawrence (1987), Saxonhouse (1985), and  Balassa (1986) 
highlight the importance of the cost of transportation as a determinant of  the 
pattern of Japanese trade. In table 5.9, I present results from regressions based 
on (17) with transport costs TC added. As a representation of TC,  I use the 
unit freight charge calculated by  Clark (1981). This proxy pertains only to 
charges of ocean shipments and does not include costs of air freight. 
22. As described in the text, first-stage  regressions are run with group strengths as dependent 
variables. The explanatory variables are JFP, JTE, JIP, and JLE When group strength is measured 
by  sales, only the intercept is statistically significant at the  1 percent level (adjusted  R2=0.54145; 
F-statistic=7.199177). When the group strength is measured by  employment, the intercept is 
significant at  the  I  percent  level. In  addition, JFP is  significant at  5 percent  level  (adjusted 
R2  =  0.66225; F-statistic = 11.29396). The predicted values of the group strengths are then used 
as explanatory  variables in the second-stage regressions. 154  K. C.Fung 
Table 5.9  Regressions with 'kansport Cost 
Constant 
Group affiliation 












9.6394*  * 
(2.5693) 




0.80564~  10-I 
(0.91634~  lo-*) 











-  12.347*** 
(- 3.7254) 
-  5.4204 
( -  0.25371) 
2.2410 
(0.26059) 
-  19.759* 
( -  1.8453) 
1.4286 
(0.13929) 
-  1.36715 
(-0.2Oo52) 
0.549605 
0.36869  1 
3.04404 
Notes: Eq. (B) uses gS and eq. (B,)  gE as the group affiliation variables. The values in parentheses 
are f-statistics. 
*Significant at 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
**Significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant at 1 percent level (two-tailed test) 
The transport costs variable is insignificant in both cases. However, adding 
TC does not affect the results of  the previous basic regression equations. The 
group affiliation  variables  (both  in terms of  sales in eq. [B] or in terms of 
employment in eq. [B,]) still have the negative sign and are significant at the 
1 percent level. One explanation of the insignificance of the added variable is 
that transport costs reduce U.S. exports as well as U.S. imports. The net im- 
pact of the U.S. industry trade balance is thus ambiguous. With net exports as 
the dependent variable,  TC does not  seem to be an appropriate explanatory 
variable. 
5.5.3  Advertising Intensity and Number of Firms as Explanatory Variables 
Adhering  to the  theoretical  model,  the  only explanatory  variables  that 
should be included are USW,, JW,, USTQ,,  JTQ, and g,. However, if we relax 
our model for empirical implementation and contrast, other relevant variables 
can reasonably be included. For example, one variable may be the intensity of 
advertising expenditures in industry  i in the United States and Japan. Adver- 
tising is an instrument of international oligopolistic rivalry that alters demand 
for a firm's product. Alternatively,  the intensity of  advertising can be used as 
a proxy for the degree of  product differentiation between goods sold by the 
United States and Japan. It is expected that other things being equal, a high 155  Japanese Industrial Groups 
advertising  intensity  by  the  United  States will  be  positively  related  to the 
United  States trade balance,  while a high  advertising intensity  by  Japan is 
negatively  related to TB. In other words,  advertising intensity can be inter- 
preted as a proxy for comparative advantage due to product differentiation. As 
a measure of  advertising  intensity,  we will use the  industry advertising ex- 
penditure per dollar sale in each country (USDi  and JDJ. 
Another variable that may reasonably be included is the number of firms in 
industry i in the United States and Japan. Based on the theoretical literature of 
Dixit (1984), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Brander and Krugman (1983), and 
Fung  (1987,  1989), we can expect that the number of  firms will affect the 
equilibrium outcome. In particular, increasing the number of firms of a coun- 
try under symmetry will raise market share and thus exports of that country. 
Thus with identical firms, the number of  U.S.  firms in industry i should be 
positively related to the U.S. trade balance, while the reverse sign is expected 
with respect to the number of firms in Japan. 
The results of these expanded regressions are given in tables 5.10 and 5.1 1. 
For the regressions that include the number of firms as an explanatory vari- 
able, the equations with the group affiliation variable gE are not significant 
overall and are not presented (although the variable gE is itself significant). 
Equations (C)-(E) essentially confirm the result that in a variety of  regres- 
Table 5.10  Regressions with Advertising Intensity 




















-  10.519** 




( -  0.34673) 
~  14.184 
( -  1.0746) 
-  1.2885 
(-0.11092) 
-  92.491 








-  11.388** 
















Note: Eq. (C)  uses gS and eq. (C,)  gE as the group affiliation variables. The values in parentheses 
are t-statistics. 
**Significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 156  K. C. Fung 
Table 5.11  Regressions with Number of Firms 
Eq. (D)  Eq. (E) 
Constant 
Group affiliation 
(gS  ) 
Japanese tariff 
and quota 









No. of Japanese 
firms 





-  12.984*** 
(- 3.4545) 
-  2.6445 
( -  0.29950) 
-  13.439 
( -  0.58524) 
-  18.031* 




(  1  ,0629) 




-  12.399** 
(- 2.3947) 
-  1.2303 
( -  0.1403 1) 
-  15.470 
(-0.69753) 




-  15.497 







R2  0.587363  0.678098 
R2  0.381045  0.43667 1 
F  2.84688  2.80871 
Nore: Eq. (D) regresses gS on the basic equation with variables of  numbers of  firms. Eq. (E) 
regresses gS on the basic equation with both  numbers of  firms and advertising intensifies. The 
values in parentheses are r-statistics. 
*Significant at 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
**Significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant at  1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
sions based on equation (17) of our model, the intensity of Japanese groupings 
is negatively related to the U.S.  balance of trade with Japan on an industry 
basis. Of all the explanatory variables employed, group affiliation is the most 
consistently significant one. 
There are some variables that are significant in one equation but not in oth- 
er~.*~  For example, in (E) the U.S. advertising intensity is found to be posi- 
tively related to U.S. net exports to Japan. This probably reflects the strategic 
effect of advertising, which can expand demand as well as shift demand from 
the firm's  rivals.  More generally, the advertising to sales ratio may  reflect 
comparative advantage due to product differentiation. Equation (E) then tells 
23. Note that in eq. (E) the variable representing number of  U.S. firms has the wrong sign and 
is significant at the 10 percent level. This may be because the assumption of symmetric firms does 
not hold. If the number of  firms can alter the equilibrium solutions (e.g., see Fung 1987), then a 
smaller number of U.S. firms may increase exports. 157  Japanese Industrial Groups 
us that the more distinctive the U.S. products are, the better the U.S. industry 
trade balance. Across equations, the degree of  explanatory power is fairly 
consistent and satisfactory, with the adjusted R2  for all regressions about 0.4. 
5.5.4  U.S. Exports as the Dependent Variable 
According to (16), an alternative implication of our model is that U.S. ex- 
ports  alone (USXC,) are also negatively related  to the degree of  Japanese 
group affiliations. Instead of  industry trade balance, I rerun the regressions 
using U.S. industry exports to Japan as the dependent variable. To adjust for 
the size of the industries, I divide the exports by Japanese consumption of that 
industry. 
Since Japanese exports to the United States are now excluded, the variable 
representing U.S.  overt  trade  barriers  becomes  irrelevant  and  is  omitted. 
Furthermore, the transport cost variable should be included since its coeffi- 
cient now has an unambiguous predicted negative sign, unlike the situation 
where the trade balance is the dependent variable. I have run regressions for 
both the linear and the log-linear versions, but the linear version performs 
much better; the results are reported in table 5.12. 
Estimates from equations (F) and (F,) show that the basic results obtained 
previously are robust with respect to a change of dependent variables. With 
adjusted U.S. exports to Japan on the left-hand side, the group affiliation var- 
iables gS  and gE still have the expected negative signs and are significant at 
the 1 percent level. But as in the trade balance equations, the unit labor costs 
again have the wrong signs, indicating that again they may act as proxies for 
other variables such as research and development intensitie~.~~  The transport 
cost variable has the expected negative sign but is not  significant in either 
equation. 
5.5.5  World Net Exports as the Dependent Variable 
A further additional regression analysis uses the world trade balance with 
Japan (WTB,) as the dependent variable. The idea is to find out if  Japanese 
group affiliations are also negatively correlated with industry trade balances 
of countries other than just the United States. World trade balance is defined 
as the exports from the rest of the world to Japan minus Japan’s exports to the 
rest of  the world. To  make the analysis meaningful, I omit all variables that 
pertain to the United States, since these are not necessarily representative of 
the characteristics of  the world.  Again,  since there are negative values in 
WTB,, the log version will not be  appropriate. The results, reported in table 
5.13, show that Japanese group affiliation is negatively correlated not only 
with U.S. trade balance but also with the world’s trade balance. In this in- 
stance, the U.S.  data are not unique.25  Japanese group intensities adversely 
24. Note further that Japanese advertising intensity also has the wrong sign. 
25. But I also ran similar regressions with world exports adjusted by consumption as the depen- 
dent variable. Generally they are not significant. The results are not presented here. 158  K. C.Fung 
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(I  ,6792) 
( -  3.1740) 
-  0.10  I93 
( -  0.53593) 
-0.65638 
( -  1.7597) 
0.51807 
(1  ,7307) 
25.274*** 
(3  3795) 
0.98993 
(  1 ,1006) 
-0.21596X 




0.46  10 13 
2.99577 
-  0.44453* * * 
-0.41369  X lo-‘ 
-0.57358  X 10-I 
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0.22628* 
(I  ,8630) 
( -  3.1808) 
-0.47427*** 





(I  ,8606) 
27.650*** 
(3.9  123) 
1.0229 
(1.1369) 
( -  0.89037) 
(0.79283) 




-0.l3213X  10-5 
-0.14102x  10-5 
-0.82762X  lo-’ 
Note: Eq. (F) uses  gS  and eq. (F,)  uses gE as the group affiliation variables. The values in 
parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at  10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant at  I  percent level (two-tailed test). 
affect U.S. net exports as well as world net exports to Japan.  The variable 
representing the number of firms in Japan has the expected significant nega- 
tive sign.  A larger number of Japanese firms increase Japan’s market  share 
and thus reduce the world’s trade balance with Japanszh 
To  summarize, I have estimated here a variety of equations generated by my 
theoretical  model.  In general, not all the coefficients conform to our predic- 
tions. However, there is fairly consistent evidence that the Japanese keiretsu 
is a factor in U.S.-Japanese trade. This basic conclusion remains robust with 
alternative  specifications of  our equation, with different proxies  of  Japanese 
group  affiliations,  and  with  correction  for  the  possible  endogenity  of  the 
group-strength variable .*’ 
26. As before, the variable representing Japan unit labor costs has the significant sign that is 
contrary to our model. 
27. In addition, alternative functional forms of the regression have also been tested. The results 
concerning the linear as well as log-linear forms are discussed in the text. To detect the effects of 
nonlinearities, I also attempted to add the square term of  each explanatory variable in turn to the 
basic equation. The regression results remain qualitatively similar to those of  the linear version. 
The significance of the group-strength variables remain robust. 159  Japanese Industrial Groups 
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(0.34071 x lo-') 
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( -  5.1220) 
417.67 




0.60676  1 
7.48052 




19.  I92 
(0.91172) 
-212.50*** 





0.749  180 
-0.51409X  lo-'"' 
13.545  1 
Nore:  Eq.  (K) uses gS  and  eq.  (K,)  use? gE as the group affiliation variables. The  values in 
parentheses are ?-statistics. 
**Significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
***Significant at  I  percent level (two-tailed test). 
5.6  Conclusion 
This paper offers an analysis of the role of Japanese keiretsu as a potential 
determinant of U.S.-Japanese  trade. Industrial groups in Japan can be classi- 
fied into three  types:  those  with  prewar  zaibatsu  origin, those  centered  on 
major  banks,  and  those  centered  on  a  prime  manufacturer.  The Japanese 
groups are linked economically through many channels. They include cross- 
holding of  shares, intragroup financing by  the main banks, subcontracting, 
regular meeting of presidents of important member firms, and the joint use of 
general trading companies as agents of imports and exports. 
In general, keiretsu are still an important component of the Japanese econ- 
omy, though they are nowhere nearly as powerful as the prewar zaibatsu. The 
links between member firms are also much looser.  Perhaps as a way to en- 
hance bargaining power,  member corporations do not deal exclusively  with 
other member firms or banks. Even subcontractors, particularly those among 
the first tier, supply firms other than the prime manufacturer.  In the long run, 
there is a general expectation that keiretsu will decline in importance as the 
Japanese economy becomes more internationalized. One exception, however, 
is the prime manufacturer-subcontractor  relationship,  which seems to be in- 
creasing in importance over time. 
To investigate the impact of keiretsu on Japanese-U.S. trade, an oligopoly 
model of the U.S.  and Japanese firms was constructed.  It was hypothesized 
according to this model that a higher degree of Japanese group affiliation will 
lead to a lower U.S. industry trade balance with Japan. I estimated the focal 160  K. C.Fung 
equation generated by this model and showed that overall there is some evi- 
dence that the extent of Japanese keiretsu is negatively  related  to the  U.S. 
trade balance by industry. I estimated similar equations with alternative spec- 
ifications and different proxies. Furthermore, I also estimated equations where 
the intensity of group strength was corrected for endogenity. In general, I con- 
clude that the phenomenon of Japanese industrial groups as a factor in U.S.- 
Japanese trade seems to remain robust. 
Since this paper is among the first direct studies of the effects of  Japanese 
keiretsu, one must be cautious in drawing policy implications. There are two 
things to keep in mind, Japanese keiretsu may be an important variable ex- 
plaining the variations of industry-level  trade, but they are unlikely to be de- 
terminants of  overall U.S. trade imbalances. On the aggregate level, macro- 
economic  conditions  remain  the  most  important  factors  that  need  to  be 
changed in order for the U.S. trade balances to improve. In addition, the theo- 
retical  model  as well as the empirical  estimations are exercises of positive 
analysis. The model does not tell us what welfare changes may occur if indeed 
there are changes in the Japanese industrial structures. 161  Japanese Industrial Groups 
Appendix 
Industries in the Sample and Percentage Drop of Industry Bade 
Balance Due to Groups 























Food and kindred products 
Fibers and textiles 
Pulp and paper products 
Chemical and allied products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Rubber products 
Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metal and products 
Fabricated metal products 
General machinery 
Electronic and electrical equipment 
Shipbuilding 
Auto parts and components 
Automobile and equipment 
Aircraft and parts 
Watches, clocks and parts 
Scientific and optical instruments 
Stone, clay and glass products 
Lumber and plywood products 
Printing and publishing 
Furniture and fixtures 













































Note: Equation (A) measures the percentage drop of  U.S. net exports due to the Japanese groups 
using the estimated coefficient of the group affiliation measured by sales. Equation (A,)  estimates 
the same percentage drop using the estimated coefficient of  the group affiliation measured by 
employment. 










U.S. exports to Japan minus U.S. imports from Japan, 1980. 
Sales of group affiliated companies as a percentage of total in- 
Employment of  group affiliated companies as a percentage of 
U.S. nominal wage ratehalue added per worker, 1980. 
Japanese nominal wage ratehahe added per worker, 1980. 
Sum of  Japanese tariffs and Japanese tariff-equivalent nontariff 
Sum of  U.S. tariffs and U.S. tariff-equivalent nontariff barriers, 
U.S. advertising expenditure/total sales, 1980. 
Japanese advertising expenditure/total sales, 1980. 
dustry sale, 1980. 
total industry employment, 1980. 
barriers, 1989. 










Number of U.S. firms,  1980. 
Number of Japanese firms,  1980. 
Ocean shipments freight charges/f.a.s. import unit values, 1977 
U.S. exports to Japadconsumption of Japan, 1980 
World’s  exports to Japan minus Japan’s exports to the world, 
Value of products minus cost of  materials and total wages and 
Number of temporary employees as a percentage of total indus- 
Number  of  individually  owned firms as a percentage of  total 
Number of  firms with more than  300 regular employees as a 
1980 
salaries in Japadnumber of firms in Japan, 1980. 
try employment in Japan, 1980. 
number of firms in Japan, 1980. 
percentage of total number of firms in Japan, 1980. 
Sources of Data 
Degrees of group affiliations gS and gE: constructed from Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants  (1990)  and  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry 
(1981). 
Japanese unit labor costs and number of firms: constructed from Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (198 1). 
S.  trade balance: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Exports: Domestic Mer- 
chandise SIC-based Products by World Areas, Publication FT610 (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1980); ibid., US.  Imports: Consumption and General SIC- 
based Products  by  World Areas, Publication  FT210 (Washington, D.C., 
1980). 
S.  unit labor costs and number of firms: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 
ofManufactures (Washington, D.C., 1980). 
U.S.  and Japanese tariffs and nontariff trade bamers: constructed from Sax- 
onhouse and Stem (1  989) and Ray ( 1990). 
U.S. advertising/total sales ratio: constructed from U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, “Input-Output  Structure of the U.S.  Economy  1977,” Survey of 
Current Business (1984). 
Japanese advertising/total sales ratio: constructed from Government of Japan, 
Administrative  Management Agency,  1980 Input-Output  Tables (Tokyo, 
1980). 
Transport costs: Clark (1981). 
Unadjusted U.S. exports to Japan: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Exports: 
Domestic  Merchandise  SIC-based Products  by  World Areas, Publication 
FT610 (Washington, D.C., 1980). 
Japanese consumption (production minus exports plus imports): constructed 
from Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (1981) and Japan Tariff 
Association, Japan Exports and Imports, Commodity by Country (Tokyo, 
1980). 163  Japanese Industrial Groups 
World  trade balance: constructed from Japan Tariff  Association, Japan Ex- 
ports and Imports, Commodity by Country (Tokyo, 1980). 
Japanese average industry profits, percentage of  firms with more than 300 
employees, percentage of temporary employees, and proportion of individ- 
ual  proprietorship: constructed from Ministry of  International Trade and 
Industry, Japan  Census of  Manufactures: Report  by  Industries  (Tokyo, 
1980) and Japan Census of  Manufactures: Report by Enterprises (Tokyo, 
1980). 
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Comment  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Fung presents an informative summary of  keiretsu groups, an  oligopolistic 
model of how keiretsu could affect net exports, and some empirical tests. My 
overall impression was that although this is an important topic, the research 
presented here remains in a very preliminary phase, particularly if it is to be 
useful to policymakers. 
I enjoyed the first section and  will  not comment on it.  I will, however, 
comment on the theory, the empirical work, and its relevance for the policy 
debate. 
Theory 
The strategy in this paper is to come up with a very simple model of  the 
group that allows us to test its effects on trade flows. The methodology is 
appropriate if  the model captures the essential features of  the group’s behav- 
ior, allowing us to place fairly tight constraints on the estimation parameters, 
and thus to accept or reject the model. 
My feeling was, however, that the model fails to capture many of  the key 
questions relating to the existence of groups. The model emphasizes the links 
between an input supplier and a final producer. The key here is that the sup- 
plier holds stock in the firm producing the final product. We  know that there 
can be gains from vertical integration when a supplier has monopoly power. 
Without vertical integration, when a monopolist supplier raises input prices, 
his customers are induced to substitute other inputs. A vertically integrated 
firm, on the other hand, can use shadow prices that reflect marginal cost and 
thus produce more efficiently and earn higher profits. 
Of course, if this is the source of the price advantage given to the Japanese 
final product producer from exchanging securities with its supplier, it could 
readily be emulated by  vertical integration in the United States. Indeed, as 
noted by  Cline and Bergsten, “Oligopoly behavior in its most intense form 
will  replicate the decisions of  a single large firm.’”  So the relationship as 
captured here does not  really explain  the existence of  groups. It  assumes 
them. Moreover, it is not really clear why we should expect Japan to derive a 
competitive advantage from these groups, unless we  make the additional as- 
sumption that in the United States there is some constraint on vertical integra- 
tion. 
But it seems to me that the reasons for the existence of groups could go far 
beyond the effects of cross-holding modeled here. On the one hand, they may 
Robert Z. Lawrence is a senior fellow in  the  Economic  Studies Program  of  the  Brookings 
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Institution. 
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simply reflect increased monopoly power. On the other, they could enhance 
efficiency by achieving the benefits of closer vertical integration while avoid- 
ing some of the costs. These benefits relate to the potential gains from reduc- 
ing  risk,  improving  information  flows  and  perhaps  certain  economies  of 
scope.  There may  also be benefits in preserving greater flexibility than  full 
vertical integration would require. In particular, in a system where core firms 
provide lifetime employment guarantees,  they  may prefer closely  tied  sup- 
pliers who can lay off their workers to vertical integration. But Fung’s model 
fails to deal with these questions, which could have an important influence on 
the qualitative nature of the results he obtains. 
Finally, let me note that what Fung has modeled is competition in the mar- 
ket for the final product market. The Japanese firm has a keiretsu association 
with its input supplier that gives it access to these inputs more cheaply because 
it has a share in final product. What many Americans are complaining about, 
however, is competition  in  the inputs market. The dispute involves not only 
the link he models where the supplier has shares in the final producer, but the 
reverse, where the final buyer has shares in the suppliers who are local. 
Empirical Tests 
The dependent variable in the test is the bilateral net trade balance. Relying 
on his model, Fung argues the effects of the group act symmetrically in export 
competition  and  in  competition  within  Japan.  His model  is one where the 
group allows the Japanese producer access to cheaper raw materials. This al- 
lows the final goods producer to charge lower prices at home and abroad, so 
this mechanism fits his formulation quite naturally. But there are other effects 
which one might believe are more powerful in Japan than they are outside. If 
the group providing the loans insists on purchases from other group members, 
for example, indeed this might make a positive contribution to the group share 
within Japan but hurt export sales abroad. So I would like to see specifications 
of the dependent variable as imports (or import shares) of particular products. 
A second problem with the dependent variable, if I understand it, is surely 
heteroskedasticity.  This means  we  probably  have  an  equation  giving huge 
weight to autos and electronics. 
The dependent variable, unit labor costs, is not clearly defined. How was it 
derived? What data sources were used? I am not sure the discussion of the 
variable which implies that it captures absolute differences in costs is really 
justified. Since this is a cross-sectional analysis, you need a purchasing-power 
parity estimate for each two-digit industry to define these units. How was this 
done? I  missed an explanation in the text, and it is surely critical. Indeed,  I 
suspect that what is really being captured here is the share of labor in overall 
income. If this is the case, it might help explain the empirical result, but not 
through the mechanism laid out in the model. In particular, the equation may 167  Japanese Industrial Groups 
be telling us of a relationship between trade performance and labor intensity 
rather than unit costs. 
Fung assumes the conditions required for a quota to have a negative effect 
on the (exporters’) trade balance. But in theory, of course, the effect is ambig- 
uous. There are higher prices and lower quantities, and when you have imper- 
fect competition, the price response hinges on the demand elasticity. This 
might explain why the empirical results of the quota are poor. It might simply 
reflect the fact that his assumption is unwarranted, rather than providing a 
good test of the effect of groups. 
Policy Implications 
Simply finding that keiretsu has a positive effect on trade fails to sort out 
the most important dilemma for policy. Are keiretsu allowing for an increase 
in egiciency or an increase in monopoly power in the domestic market? Either 
could boost the trade balance, but the welfare effects for the United States and 
Japan could be very different. This is the key issue on which policymakers 
need help. 
The official U.S. contention in the current negotiations in the Structural 
Impediments Initiative is, of course, that there are inegiciencies due to these 
groups. These result precisely from the effects on restraining trade. Even if 
the trade balance is improved, welfare could be  reduced, since the groups 
practices could hurt Japanese consumers and U.S. producers. The perplexing 
thing to an economist is how such a situation could persist. Why does com- 
petition not force some producers to buy cheaper and better foreign goods and 
thus drive those relying on an inefficient keiretsu system out of business? In- 
deed, the evidence on price differentials between Japan and the rest of  the 
world do seem to suggest such practices exist. 
My suspicion is that the groups result in both efficiency gains and losses. In 
the auto industry, group affiliations seem to have  provided benefits. But  in 
other cases,  there are suggestions of  inefficiency. It is worth recalling, for 
example, that in an early study, Caves and Uekusa found: “After controlling 
for other determinants of profitability, we found that profits . . . were if any- 
thing negatively related to group affiliation. . . . It remains distinctly possible 
that rents yielded by group affiliation are consumed in technical inefficiency.”* 
Indeed, it seems to me, one way to sort this out would be to examine per- 
formance in third markets rather than in the bilateral balance. We  would like 
to know if given the performance in third markets, the United States tends to 
do worse in Japan in sectors where there is a keiretsu presence. 
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